C O N T E N T S I. EAST-WEST DIFFERENCES IN GERMANY: TIME-LAG OR

THE "HALLESCHE GRAUREIHER"-SERIES: FULL LIST OF TITLES
I.
East-West differences in Germany: Time-lag or divergent development?
The unification of Germany in 1990 meant that the former G.D.R., with the approval of the majority of its 16 million citizens, gave up her sovereignty and was merged into the Federal Republic of Germany. Unified Germany now has 82 million inhabitants. Through the act of unification, the East Germans became a minority of about 20 percent of the total population of Germany. This minority was obliged to adapt to a fundamental transformation of its accustomed political, legal and economic system, whereas things remained more or less unchanged for the West German majority. Thus, both by the sheer logic of numbers and by the fact that the West German institutions prevailed, a distinctly hegemonic situation was established in unified Germany.
Although the two German states were politically and ideologically separated for forty years, they shared a common cultural and historical background. In consequence, both the structural constraints of the unification process and the cultural similarity of the two parts to be reassembled seem to lead to the following common-sense hypothesis: After a period of transitory complications, the most likely outcome to be expected is the complete social, political and economic reintegration of Germany on the basis of the predominant West German model.
Sociological modernisation theory points into the same direction: From this point of view the former G.D.R., due to its one-party political system, its command economy and its mediocre standard of living, was a case of 'blocked modernisation'. This blockage has been lifted after unification. Wolfgang Zapf argues on the basis of recent survey data:
'If one takes acceptance of market economy and democracy together with satisfaction with one's own economic situation as components of an "index of transformation" (...), the direction seems to be obvious. (...) My assumption is that within five more years the East-West differences in Germany will loose their present importance' (Zapf 1998: 31) .
Thus, informed common sense and modernisation theory arrive both at the same conclusion: The East-West differences will disappear. The only remaining question is, how long this will take. Is the period of transition almost over, as Wolfgang Zapf suggests, or will it take several decades or even generations?
As only eight years have passed since the fall of the G.D.R., we are not in a position to give a serious test to the long-term-adaptation variant of the modernisation hypothesis. But there are strong indications that the process of adaptation and integration of East Germany does not run as smoothly as expected.
A good example are the detailed analyses of the development of the East German labour market in the first five years of German unification by Burkart Lutz (1996) .
Lutz finds very little indication that the East German economy and employment structure is closing the gap and veering towards the patterns of the West German service society. He sees no clear signs of a "take off" of sustained economic growth or of a recovery of the industry in East Germany. In consequence, insufficient purchasing power is generated by the East German economy. The private service sector cannot flourish, whereas the public employment sector is oversized, largely due to huge transfer payments coming in from the West.
According to Lutz's view, the high rates of unemployment and of unstable employment may well be a lasting feature of the East German labour market. He does not expect a quick closing of the gap between East and West.
Of course, it is quite impossible for a present day sociologist to tell with any degree of precision whether West and East Germany will eventually diverge or converge, and if so, when and in what direction. In any case, if the situation will be inspected again in a generation's time, what we shall find then will not be the result of deterministic mechanisms. It will have been influenced by purposeful human interventions which are hard to foresee. Therefore, we shall remain prudent in this respect. Rather, we want to tackle the question in a roundabout and indirect way, by looking at a very special, but significant case of labour market development --the case of female part-time work.
II. Between causation and accusation: Female labour market participation and the rate of unemployment
One of salient features of the German labour market after reunification is the "jobless growth" of the German economy and the constant rise of unemployment in East and West Germany, from 2.6 million in 1991 (6.6%) to 4.8 million unemployed persons in February 1998 (12.6%). In East Germany, the unemployment rate is twice as high as in the West. In February 1998, a staggering 21.4% of the East German labour force were registered as unemployed, compared with 10.4% in the West.
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Both in everyday discourse and in modernisation theory, the East-West-difference of unemployment rates is usually accounted for by means of the time-lag explanation mentioned above. It argues that the East German labour market is still "lagging behind" and that the process of economic adjustment to the Western model has yet to be accomplished.
However, this is not the only explanation compatible with the paradigm of modernisation theory. Recently, an alternative explanation has been put forward which is of particular interest for our present purpose (Schneider 1994;  Kommission für Zukunftsfragen 1997): It is held that the higher unemployment rate in Eastern Germany is not primarily caused by major structural deficits. Rather, the enormous reduction of the East German labour market from 9.9 million jobs in 1989 to 6.0 million jobs in 1998 is considered to be the result of a process of structural normalisation which is now more or less completed. According to this view, both in East and in West Germany the proportion of gainfully employed persons relative to the total population of working age is virtually identical (IWH 1995) . There is no "structural lag" in this respect.
Instead, a "cultural lag" explanation is advanced according to which East German women adhere to a much larger extent to the social norm of full employment than their West German counterparts. This strong work orientation leads to a higher 1 At present, there is no important gender difference in the overall rate of unemployment in
Germany. There are, however, slight differences between East and West. In West Germany, the male unemployment rates are slightly higher than the figures for women. In East Germany, the risk of women to become unemployed is 10-15% higher than that of men. However tempting it might be, this is not the place for polemical controversy.
Instead, we wish to explore more soberly some of the implications and consequences of the undeniable empirical fact that there are considerable differences in the labour market participation of West and East German women, whereas the employment behaviour of men is much more similar.
III. East German women's feeling for work
One of the most consistent empirical findings, obtained both by survey analysis and by qualitative social research, is the significant difference between East and West German women's attitudes to employment. There is widespread consensus among social scientists that many more women in East Germany have a strong subjective attachment to being economically active than their Western Western Germany agree that it is 'much better, if men are fully employed and women stay at home to look after the household and the children' 4 (cf. table I). In East Germany, the agreement to the same question was 33% in 1991. It decreased to only 26% in 1996. It is interesting to note that in both parts of Germany the gender difference of the replies is negligible. This gender homogeneity of opinion gives support to the hypothesis that two divergent "work ethics" co-exist in the two parts of unified Germany.
3 Cf. Arnhold (1996) , Bauer et al. (1996) , Becker (1998 ), Braun (1995 , Datenreport (1997), Engelbrech et al. (1997) , Holst / Schupp (1996) , Nickel (1997 ), Schulze Buschoff (1997 , Zukunftskommission (1998) . For summaries of earlier findings: Kreckel (1995) and Schenk (1995 1. Both models still bear the stamp of their common predecessor, the normative model of the petty-bourgeois German "breadwinner family", where the husband was supposed to be the family head and sole provider of income, whereas his wife was barred from gainful employment after marriage. She was expected to look after him, their children and elderly parents as well as after the household.
2. As far as the normal biography of men is concerned, the line of continuity remained largely intact in both parts of post-war Germany. Men were -and still are -expected to lead a life of full employment. Part-time work is deemed to be inappropriate for any able-bodied man. To this day, the part-time employment rates of men have remained minimal in both parts of Germany. The deeply rooted social norm that a man's life is a working life is a major obstacle to all job-sharing campaigns.
3. Household, family and children continue to be primarily the responsibility of women in East and West Germany, whether they are fully-employed or not.
Although certain tendencies toward a more equal sharing of the practical and emotional tasks of domestic life have been reported from both parts of Germany, the major burden still tends to be carried by women.
4. As stated above, the normal biography of women living in the G.D.R. was increasingly oriented towards life-long full employment and a full contribution to the household income. This was encouraged by the East German labour legislation, the social security system and the official social policy, which tried to relieve women of parts of their responsibilities, especially in child care and education. Thus, the model of the "dual-earner marriage" was the normative model of private life in the G.D.R.
5. Women in the Federal Republic were "lagging behind" in this respect.
Interrupted employment careers, part-time work and the role of supplementary earner are wide-spread characteristics of female biographies in the West
German model. This model is encouraged by the organisation of the social security net and the system of taxation, as well as by the absence of sufficient provisions for full-time child care and education. In this way, the petty-bourgeois model of the "breadwinner marriage", where the wife stayed fully at home, was gradually replaced by the West German compromise model which has been described as "modernised breadwinner marriage" (Pfau-Effinger / Geissler 1992).
Given the hegemonial circumstances of the German unification process stated above, the East Germans are now fully exposed to the political, legal and economic framework which was originally developed in the West German Federal
Republic. This framework provides the very same structural and institutional incentives which have lead to the "modernised breadwinner model" in West Germany, whereas the structural conditions which once underpinned the East German "dual earner" model have been superseded. In this situation it seems adventurous to expect anything but full adaptation to the only remaining structural framework -even if, as in this case, "adaptation" would mean for East Germans to return to less modern model.
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But as we have seen, the majority of East Germans of both genders have so far remained recalcitrant to follow the predicted path. This is illustrated in table III, which shows that views held about gender roles and women's work diverge considerably between East and West Germany. On the basis of these views, East
German women are less likely than West German women to accept the compromise solution of working part-time. In fact, a considerable majority of 7 However, if one prefers to follow the argument of Catherine Hakim (1997) , one would have to say that this would not be a move backwards, but a forward step towards modernity -or even towards "post-modernity". According to Hakim this modern world is characterized by individualism, structural heterogeneity and 'the coexistence of two qualitatively different work orientations among women (and men) of working age'(p.62): One type of persons are committed to careers in the labour market and often remain childless; the other type of persons give priority to domestic activities and consider gainful employment as secondary.
working women in East Germany state a preference for working full-time; in West Germany, it is the other way round (see 
If one accepts this interpretation, it follows that the strong feelings held in East
Germany against the part-time work of women cannot be treated as some kind of feminine eccentricity. Rather, the basis is a wide-spread social consensus.
If Ibsen's Nora had been living in modern East Germany, she would hardly have been able provoke her husband's wrath by looking for a job of her own. But she might have irritated him and her children much more, if she had decided to work part-time and to spend the afternoons at her Doll's House.
IV. Nora's coming back
The hypothesis of the two different marriage-models, the "dual-earner model" and the "modernised breadwinner model", may well explain the divergent work orientations of West and East German women. But it still does not give an answer to our question whether the East German variant will be able to withstand the structural pressures of the hegemonial situation in unified Germany.
In two earlier papers (Kreckel 1995 , Schenk 1995 Given the high degree of differentiation of East German society, the real development will probably contain elements of all four variants. Our question will have to be, then, whether the alternatives three and four are likely to maintain enough strength to have a lasting impact.
Some empirical indication giving support to this assumption can be found by looking more closely at the structure and the development of female part-time work in East Germany. In fact, at first glance the part-time rates of women in East and West Germany at the time just before German unification do not seem to be dramatically different: In 1988, 27% of the employed women in East Germany worked on part-time contracts (Winkler 1990 ). The corresponding rate in West Germany was 32% (Blossfeld, Rohwer 1997) . But the following structural differences must be kept in mind:
1. At the time of the disparition of the G.D.R. 78% of the women aged 15 -60 were economically active. The activity rate of West German women was only 60%,(cf. 
{TABLE VI}
The impression of continuity emanating from these data is a very strong one. It gives support to our hypothesis that the strong attachment of the East German population to women's full employment has particular resilience because it is an integral part of a specific way of life, not an isolated element (or a 'feminine eccentricity').
One major exception has to be noted, however. As considerable numbers of older persons have been obliged to leave the labour market in East Germany, part-time work for people over 55 is not any more a realistic issue. From 1989 to 1993, about 1 million elderly women and men left the employment system of East Germany due to special programs of early retirement (Lutz 1996, p. 164) . Hence, in 1996 we found only few persons aged 55-65 economically active in East
Germany --the rate of women amounted to 36.4%, for men to 44.2%
(Statistisches Bundesamt) 8 . In this case, it seems that the 'regressive path of development' is being enforced.
That is, it must be assumed that many East Germans are not prepared to give up their specific way of life, which includes full-employment and economic parity for both genders, unless they are pressed to do so (see table VII ). That is, those whose competitive position on the labour market is weakest are most likely to settle for part-time work (see table VIII).
{TABLE VII} {TABLE VIII}
As table VIII shows, East German women make use of their education and occupational status as resources supporting their claim to full labour market participation. If there is a chance to remain fully employed, a well qualified woman in East Germany is likely to seize this chance whereas her West German counterpart is much more likely to accept alternative options, such as part-time work or withdrawal from the active labour force.
Certainly, the motivating powers of the financial advantages gained by maintaining the "dual earner model" are not to be denied. That is, one should not be too idealistic about the "East German way of life". It clearly has a strong materialistic underpinning, and there is no need to romanticise about it.
In other words, and this is what sociologists should be interested in, both material interests and shared views point into the same direction in East Germany: The "dual-earner model" is not likely to dissolve itself into the hegemonial "modernised breadwinner model". Quite the opposite may be the case. If one looks at the younger age groups of the West German population, one gets the strong impression that the "dual earner model" is slowly making headway there (cf . table   I ).
On the basis of the data discussed in this paper, we do not see how the propagation of women's part-time work could compensate for the steady loss of jobs in both parts of Germany. That is, if one were to assume that the reduction of working time could be an answer to the endemic unemployment problem in contempory Germany, this reduction could not be achieved by means of a further expansion of female part-time work. In West Germany, younger women are more strongly oriented to full-time work than older women. Therefore, the number of women prepared to opt for part-time employment is likely to decrease in the future.
In East Germany, the potential for female part-time work on a voluntary basis is even more limited.
That is, if a further reduction of working time is going to be achieved in Germany, it will either have to be done by obliging women to give up a substantial part of the occupational terrain they have already conquered. Or, if a consensual solution is sought, the reduction of working time will have to include both genders. In West Germany, this seems to require a major reorganization of the gendered practice of dividing domestic and occupational work. In East Germany, the necessary reorientation might be less incisive. The transitition from the "dual full-time earner model" to a "dual reduced-hours earner model" could be easier to achieve.
It may will be that Nora and Torvald Helmer would have found it less difficult to come to terms with the task of sharing their lives in post-full-employment society, if they had been steeled by the East German experience. But shall we ever know? "While the husband is considered to be the breadwinner of the family, the primary tasks of the wife are to look after the household and the children."
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"There is something wrong, if the man is staying at home looking after the children whereas the woman is going out to work."
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Economical reasons of employment "The best way for women to become independent is to have their own occupational careers." 
